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"No Pass, No Play": Equal Protection Analysis
Under the
Federal and State Constitutions
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a growing concern has emerged in society regarding the
quality of education offered by our public school systems. One outgrowth
of this concern has been the emergence of so called "no pass, no play"
rules or statutes.' While these rules vary from state to state, and even vary
within many states, the basic thrust of these rules is to provide that if a
student does not maintain a certain level of academic achievement, he or
she will be prohibited from participating in any extracurricular activities2 for
a specified period of time.3
Since their adoption, "no pass, no play" rules have become a subject of
controversy at both the local and national level. 4 Proponents of the rules
argue that they advance education by giving the student who fails to meet
minimum academic standards an incentive to do better, and more free time
1. Texas is the only state that has enacted a "no pass, no play" statute. TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 21.920 (1987). However, various school boards throughout the nation have adopted
rules which have the same effect on students. Thus, throughout the rest of this Note, the
author will simply refer to the state action in question as "no pass, no play" rules.
2. While there is a general association in society between extracurricular activities and
interscholastic athletics, it is important to emphasize that the term has no such limitation.
Extracurricular activities include field trips, student clubs or organizations, student government
and athletics. Thus, contrary to the perception of some, these rules do not simply affect student
athletes.
3. While the following list is by no means exhaustive, it does serve to exemplify how these
"no pass, no play" rules differ from area to area:
(a) The State of Texas: If a student fails any class he may not participate in extracurricular
activities. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.920 (1987).
(b) Helena, Montana: A student must maintain a 2.0 or "C" average to participate in
extracurricular activities. Adams, Montana Court OKs "'No Pass, No Play", NAT'L L.J., Oct.
20, 1986, at 33, col. 1.
(c) Los Angeles, California: A student must maintain a "C" average and have no failing
grades to participate in extracurricular activities. McGrath, Blowing the Whistle on Johnny,
TrmE, Jan. 30, 1984, at 80.
(d) Norwalk, Connecticut: A student must maintain a 1.5 or "D +" average to participate
in extracurricular activities. Cavanaugh, Student Athletes Face Stricter Grade Rules, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1984, § 23, at 1, col. 1.
4. See, e.g., Reinhold, Impact of Texas School Law Hits Home With Football Season,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1985, § 1, at 16, col. 2; Johnson, "No Pass, No Play" Rule Raises
Furor, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, § 1, at 32, col. 1; A New Law Cuts Deep in the Heart of
Texas, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 4, 1985, at 17; School Athletes Hit the Books-or Else, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1985, at 10.
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to devote to studies. However, opponents of the rules question this logic.
They contend that the rules may in fact lead more students to either drop
out of school altogether, or to pursue academic course work which does not
present any substantial challenge.6 The most recent entrant in the controversy
has been the judiciary. Challengers in the courts have attacked the consti-
tutionality of these "no pass, no play" rules by asserting that the rules
violate their equal protection rights under both the Federal Constitution and
the relevant state constitution.7 However, as of yet, the challengers have not
had success."
This Note will focus on the merits of the equal protection challenges which
have been raised against these "no pass, no play" rules under both the
Federal Constitution and the individual state constitutions. Section I of this
Note will briefly examine the merits of the federal claim and will conclude
that such a challenge is, at best, a weak one. Section II of this Note will
discuss the recent developments in state constitutional law and will suggest
that these developments may present one avenue, at least in some states, by
which "no pass, no play" rules may be found to be unconstitutional as
violative of equal protection. The Note will conclude that if a student's
individual equal protection rights are to be protected from these "no pass,
no play" rules, then that protection will have to come through interpretations
by state courts of their respective constitutions.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS UNDER
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
A. Background
The equal protection clause 9 of the United States Constitution plays a
central role in the cases challenging the constitutionality of "no pass, no
play" rules. However, before one can attempt to discuss the merits of any
equal protection challenge, it is helpful to review the analytical process that
5. McGrath, supra note 3, at 80.
6. A New Law Cuts Deep in the Heart of Texas, supra note 4, at 17.
7. In one case, the challenger also asserted that the "no pass, no play" rule violated his
due process rights under both the federal and state constitutions. See Spring Branch Indep.
School Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1170 (1986).
However, this challenge, which was quickly rejected by the court, is outside the scope of this
Note.
8. See id.; Montana ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees, 726 P.2d 801 (Mont. 1986).
9. The equal protection clause, found in the fourteenth amendment, states: "No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV, § 1.
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the Supreme Court has developed to interpret the equal protection clause. 10
This section will provide a brief review of this analytical process.
When confronted with an equal protection challenge under the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court will first ask whether the government clas-
sification infringes upon a "fundamental right"'" or constitutes a "suspect
classification."'' 2 If so, the Court will subject the classification to a strict
standard of review and the government will need to show that the classifi-
cation is "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest."' 3 His-
tory has shown that this test is a very difficult one for the government to
meet.' 4 In fact, one commentator has aptly noted that this standard of review
is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."' 5 Thus, if the Court finds that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review, the classification will almost
certainly be found to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Traditionally, if the Court did not find that the classification infringed
upon a "fundamental right" or constituted a "suspect classification," the
classification would then be subject to a mere rational-basis standard of
review.' 6 Under this standard, "the Court will ask only whether it is con-
ceivable that the classification bears a rational relationship to an end of
government which is not prohibited by the Constitution.' '1 7 History has
shown that the rational-basis standard of review is a very easy one for the
government to satisfy. 8 As one commentator has observed, the rational-
basis standard involves "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact." 9 Thus, if the Court finds that the rational-basis standard is the
appropriate standard of review, the classification will almost certainly survive
the equal protection challenge.
10. The historical development of this analytical process is outside the scope of this Note.
For an overview of this development, see Note, Alternative Models of Equal Protection Analysis:
Plyler v. Doe, 24 B.C.L. Rav. 1363, 1367-82 (1983).
11. Examples of rights recognized by the Court as "fundamental" include: the right to
travel (e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); the right to vote (e.g., Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)); and, the right to obtain a criminal appeal (e.g., Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).
12. The classic examples of a "suspect class" are those involving race (e.g., Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)) or national origin (e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)).
13. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original).
14. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984).
15. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 8 (1972).
16. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969); J. Wn.-
LuiS, CONsnTIoNAL ANALysIs 291 (1978).
17. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNsTrunoNAL LAW § 14.3 (3d ed. 1986).
18. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
19. See Gunther, supra note 15, at 8.
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While the preceding two standards provided the only basis of review under
the equal protection clause for many years, the past few decades have given
rise to a third standard of review. This intermediate-level standard has been
recognized by the Court most clearly when the classification in question has
been based on gender.20 Under this standard, the government must show
that the classification it has created is "substantially related" to an "im-
portant governmental objective[]." 21 While the precise requirements called
for by this standard are still not clear, it is clear that the standard requires
something less than strict scrutiny and something more than mere rational-
basis. In applying this standard, one finds that the Court has sometimes
held the classification in question to survive the equal protection challenge,
and other times it has held the classification in question not to survive the
equal protection challenge. 22 Thus, it is not possible to make any broad
generalizations regarding this standard of review.
B. Application of the Federal Equal Protection Analysis to
"No Pass, No Play" Rules
1. Strict Scrutiny
Using the multi-tiered equal protection analysis that is employed by the
Supreme Court, this section will briefly examine the merits of a federal
equal protection challenge to a "no pass, no play" rule. The first question
one must ask is whether a "no pass, no play" rule infringes upon a "fun-
damental right" or gives rise to a "suspect classification." If so, the rule
will be subject to strict scrutiny by the Court and, as noted above, will
almost certainly be struck down.
By examining the relevant authority, it seems certain that the Supreme
Court will not find an individual's right to participate in extracurricular
activities to rise to the level of a "fundamental right." Initially, it should
be noted that the Court has been very reluctant to add to the list of recognized
"fundamental rights." ' 23 In addition, while the Court has recognized the
importance of education in a number of its opinions, 24 it has specifically
held that education itself is not a "fundamental right" under the United
20. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
21. Id. at 197.
22. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (survived the challenge); Craig,
429 U.S. 190 (did not survive the challenge).
23. See Note, supra note 10, at 1372.
24. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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States Constitution.2 Obviously, if the Court is unwilling to place education
within the realm of a "fundamental right," it will certainly not be willing
to attach such a label to extracurricular activities which, arguably, are part
of the educational process. In fact, several courts have used this precise
reasoning to dismiss federal equal protection claims involving extracurricular
activities.26 Thus, there is little or no doubt that one's right to participate
in extracurricular activities does not rise to the level of a "fundamental
right" under the Federal Constitution.
Turning to the issue of whether a "no pass, no play" rule gives rise to
a "suspect classification" under the Federal Constitution, the answer here
also seems to be negative. The concept of a "suspect class" finds its roots
in the often cited footnote of Justice Stone's majority opinion in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. 27 There, Justice Stone wrote: "Nor need we
enquire . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 28
The Court has relied upon this language to find classifications based on
race or national origin to be "suspect.' '29 However, again the Court has
been hesitant to expand the list of "suspect classes." 30 It would be a very
strained argument to suggest that a classification which distinguishes students
on the basis of academic achievement is "suspect." Yet that is the classi-
fication used in the "no pass, no play" rules: if one fails to maintain a
specified level of academic achievement, one may not participate in extra-
curricular activities for a certain period of time. One's race, national origin
or any other immutable characteristic which is normally the basis of a
"suspect classification" does not seem to be a factor.3' Thus, one can
25. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 ("We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and
have found those arguments unpersuasive."); Plyler, 457 U.S. 221 ("Public education is not
a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution.").
26. Cooper v. Oregon School Activities Ass'n, 52 Or. App. 425, 438-41, 629 P.2d 386,
394-96 (1981) ("Although interscholastic sports is an important and integral part of a student's
total educational experience, we cannot classify plaintiff's interest as 'fundamental' in view of
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the right to education itself is not fun-
damental."); Montana ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees, 726 P.2d 801, 803 (1986) ("The
United States Supreme Court has held that education is not a fundamental right guaranteed
by the federal Constitution. Based on that holding, we conclude that participation in extra-
curricular activities is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution." (citation omitted)).
27. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
28. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
29. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
30. See Note, supra note 10, at 1373.
31. Some have argued that the "no pass, no play" rules give rise to a "suspect class"
because the effect of these rules has been disproportionately felt by members of minority
groups. See Taylor, Education Reform-Or Discrimination?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at
19871
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conclude that the Court will not find a "no pass, no play" rule to give rise
to a "suspect classification."
Having determined that a "no pass, no play" rule does not infringe upon
a "fundamental right" or give rise to a "suspect classification," it is clear
that such a rule will not be subject to strict scrutiny under the Federal
Constitution. The next issue is whether intermediate-level scrutiny or rational-
basis scrutiny will be the appropriate standard of review. While arguments
can be made on both sides, it seems clear that the Court will find the
rational-basis standard to be the appropriate standard.
2. Intermediate-Level Scrutiny
The Court has applied intermediate-level scrutiny to several different types
of cases.3 2 However, the Court has never clearly set forth the elements which
it looks to in order to invoke such a standard.3 One commentator has
suggested the presence of one of two circumstances whenever the Court has
invoked intermediate-level scrutiny.3 4 The first circumstance is when "im-
portant, though not necessarily 'fundamental' or 'preferred,' interests are
at stake." ' 35 The second circumstance is when "sensitive, although not nec-
essarily suspect, criteria of classification are employed." '36 Clearly, the second
circumstance is not raised by a "no pass, no play" rule. Classifying students
on the basis of academic achievement does not give rise to either a "suspect"
or "sensitive" classification. Thus, if the Court were to invoke intermediate-
level scrutiny to review a "no pass, no play" rule, it would have to be based
upon the first circumstance.
The challengers of a "no pass, no play" rule could argue that, while
education is not a "fundamental right" under the Federal Constitution, the
Court has certainly recognized it to be a very important right.31 In fact, in
Plyler v. Doe,3s the important role which education plays in our society was
clearly one of the factors which compelled the Court to invoke intermediate-
10, col. 1. However, even if such a disproportionate effect were actually shown, the Supreme
Court has clearly held that such an effect alone is not enough to constitute a violation of the
equal protection clause. One must also show that the government had a discriminatory purpose
in adopting the rule. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). It seems clear that a govern-
ment's purpose in adopting a "no pass, no play" rule is based upon its belief that such a rule
advances education. Thus, this argument would also not be a successful challenge under the
equal protection clause.
32. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 531-33 (The authors suggest
that intermediate-level scrutiny has been employed in cases involving gender, illegitimacy and
alienage.).
33. Id. at 534.
34. L. TRmE, AmasucAN CO NSTITUTONAL LAW §§ 16-31, at 1089-90 (1978).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 31, at 1090.
37. See supra note 24.
38. 457 U.S. 202.
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level scrutiny in reviewing a school financing plan.39 Thus, if one considers
participation in extracurricular activities to be part of the overall educational
process, 40 an argument can be made that the importance of developing well-
rounded, educated children should invoke intermediate-level scrutiny to re-
view a "no pass, no play" rule. However, this argument is unlikely to
succeed for several reasons. First, while the Court has recognized the im-
portance of education, it has also recognized that decisions regarding edu-
cational policy are more appropriately made by state and local authorities.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,4' the Court wrote
that:
Education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad
of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems." The
very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide
public school system suggests that "there will be more than one consti-
tutionally permissible method of solving them," and that, within the
limits of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems"
should be entitled to respect.' 2
Second, while the Court did apply intermediate-level scrutiny in Plyer,43
that case also involved the children of illegal aliens. Thus, the intermediate-
level scrutiny applied by the Court seems to have been invoked not only
because of the importance of education but also because of the presence of
a disadvantaged group. In a "no pass, no play" challenge, that element
would not be present.
Finally, while the Court has invoked intermediate-level scrutiny in several
cases, the prevailing view of the Court today is that the rational-basis test
will be invoked when the governmental classification "does not involve a
fundamental constitutional right, suspect classification, or the characteristics
of alienage, sex or legitimacy." 44 Given these facts, while an argument can
be made that intermediate-level scrutiny should be the appropriate standard
of review for a "no pass, no play" rule, this argument is, at best, a weak
one. Rather, one can safely conclude that the Court will find the rational-
basis standard to be the appropriate standard of review to apply to a "no
pass, no play" rule.
3. Rational-Basis Test
Applying the rational-basis standard to a "no pass, no play" rule, it is
clear that a federal equal protection challenge to such a rule will not be
39. Id. at 221-24.
40. Several lower federal courts have recognized this concept. See, e.g., Lee v. Macon
County Bd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194, 197 (M.D. Ala. 1968) ("[Athletics is] an integral part
of the public school system ... .
41. 411 U.S. 1.
42. Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
43. 457 U.S. 202.
44. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17.
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successful. Certainly, the government has a legitimate interest in advancing
the education of its youth. Since there is a rational basis for believing that
a "no pass, no play" rule promotes this purpose by providing students with
both incentive and time to study, the Court will clearly uphold the rule.
Thus, if the individuals who are adversely affected by these rules are going
to have any success in the courts, this success will have to be based upon
a source other than the Federal Constitution.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Background
Over the past fifty years, the scope of the Federal Constitution has been
greatly expanded by the federal judiciary. A significant portion of this
expansion came during the Warren Court era. During this era, the "Court
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to nationalize civil rights, making
the great guarantees of life, liberty and property binding on all governments
throughout the nation. ' 4 However, one effect of this expansion was to limit
significantly any development in the area of state constitutional law. When
one spoke of constitutional adjudication, the focus was on the Constitution
of the United States and not on the individual state constitutions.
In recent years, this trend has begun to shift. As one commentator has
observed, "state courts have increasingly relied on state constitutions to
decide issues formerly governed by the United States Constitution. '46 By
doing so, the state courts have begun to interpret their own constitutions to
be more protective of individual rights than the Federal Constitution.47
In light of these recent developments in state constitutional law, this section
of the Note will focus on the merits of a state equal protection challenge
to a "no pass, no play" rule. 48 While state courts are clearly not bound by
45. W. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, The James Madison Lecture, New York University, (Nov. 18,
1986).
46. B. McGRAw, Preface to DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONsTrrTIoNAL LAW at vii (B.
McGraw ed. 1985).
47. See W. Brennan, supra note 45. ("Between 1970 and 1984, state courts, increasingly
reluctant to follow the federal lead, have handed down over 250 published opinions holding
that the constitutional minimums set by the United States Supreme Court were insufficient to
satisfy the more stringent requirements of state constitutional law.").
48. While many states technically do not have an equal protection clause, most have
interpreted other clauses of their constitution to include the guarantee of equal protection. See,
e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). In Lujan, the court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that no
state shall deny a person equal protection of the law. Although the Colorado
Constitution does not contain an identical provision, it is well-established that a
[Vol. 63:161
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federal precedent when they interpret their own constitutions, one finds that
in the equal protection area, most state courts have chosen to follow the
analytical framework developed by the United States Supreme Court.49 Thus,
part B of this section will discuss the merits of a state equal protection
challenge to a "no pass, no play" rule within this federal analytical frame-
work. Part C of this section will tiun focus on the merits of a state equal
protection challenge in those few states which have begun to move away
from the federal framework and develop their own analytical approach to
their equal protection clause. As one will see, if a student's right to participate
in extracurricular activities is going to be protected, then that protection will
have to come through interpretations by state courts of their respective consti-
tutions.
B. State Equal Protection Analysis Within the Federal Framework
The United States Supreme Court has clearly held that education is not
a "fundamental right" under the Federal Constitution. ° However, this hold-
ing does not preclude each state court from considering the issue for it-
self under the relevant portions of its own constitution. The various state
courts which have confronted this issue have gone different ways. Some
courts have held education to be a "fundamental right" under their state
constitution' and others have not. 2 Obviously, the ultimate determination
a court reaches regarding this issue is of critical importance in a state which
like guarantee exists within the constitution's due process clause and that its
substantive application is the same insofar as equal protection analysis is con-
cerned.
Id. at 1014 (citations omitted). See also Karasik, Equal Protection of the Law Under the Federal
and Illinois Constitutions: A Contrast in Unequal Treatment, 30 DE PAUL L. Ray. 263, 270
n.33 (1981) ("Illinois was only the eighth state to include an equal protection clause in its
constitution. Most states, however, compensated for this constitutional defect by expanding
other provisions, most commonly the due process clause.").
49. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1195, 1222
(1985) ("Most state courts use conventional federal equal protection analysis when interpreting
the various equality provisions of their state constitutions.").
50. See supra note 25.
51. States which have held that education is a "fundamental right" under their own con-
stitution include: Alaska (Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School Sys., 536 P.2d 793 (Alaska
1975)); Arizona (Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973)); California (Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)); Washington (Seattle School
Dist. No. I of King County v. Washington, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)); West
Virginia (Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979)); Wisconsin (Buse v. Smith,
74 Wis. 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976)); and, Wyoming (Washakie County School Dist. No. I
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980)).
52. States which have held that education is not a "fundamental right" under their own
constitution include: Colorado (Lujan, 649 P.2d 1005); Georgia (McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga.
632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981)); Idaho (Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635
(1975)); Maryland (Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758
(1983)); and Ohio (Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979)).
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employs the federal framework to decide a state equal protection challenge.
This section will examine the merits of a state equal protection challenge to
a "no pass, no play" rule in states which have held education to be a
"fundamental right," states which have held education not to be a "fun-
damental right," and states which have not yet decided the issue. As one
might expect, the chance one has for a successful state equal protection
challenge varies greatly depending upon within which of these three groups
the challenger's state falls.
1. Application of the Federal Framework in States That Have
Held Education To Be a "Fundamental Right"
In a state which has held education to be a "fundamental right" guaranteed
by the state constitution, it is clear that, under the federal equal protection
framework, any classification which restricts or penalizes the exercise of this
fundamental right will be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. 53 As dem-
onstrated above, this standard of review is a very difficult one for the
government to meet. 4 The court will require the government to sh6w a
compelling governmental interest, including an almost perfect fit between
the means chosen and the end sought to be achieved, in order to justify its
classification. In almost every case, the court will find the classification to
fall short of this strict scrutiny standard, and the classification will be found
to violate the state's equal protection clause. Thus, in a state which has held
education to be a "fundamental right," the critical determination a court
must make when confronted with a state equal protection challenge to a
"no pass, no play" rule is whether an individual's right to participate in
extracurricular activities falls within the boundaries of this "fundamental
right." If it does, a "no pass, no play" rule will be subject to strict scrutiny
and will almost certainly be invalidated. If it does not, a "no pass, no play"
rule will only be subject to a rational-basis standard and will almost certainly
be upheld.5
Examining the relevant case law in those states which have held education
to be a "fundamental right," it becomes evident that a challenger to a "no
pass, no play" rule can make a strong argument that an individual's right
to participate in extracurricular activities is encompassed within his "fun-
damental right" to receive an education. As long ago as 1927, the Arizona
Supreme Court emphasized that the concept of education was by no means
limited to the learning of the "three R's." In Alexander v. Phillips" the
Court wrote:
53. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
56. 31 Ariz. 503, 254 P. 1056 (1927).
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That athletic games under proper supervision tend to the proper devel-
opment of the body is a self-evident fact. It is not always realized,
however, that they have a most powerful and beneficial effect upon the
development of character and morale. To use the one game of football
as an illustration, the boy who makes a successful football player must
necessarily learn self-control under the most trying circumstances, cour-
age, both physical and moral, in the face of strong opposition, sacrifice
of individual ease for a community purpose, teamwork to the exclusion
of individual glorification, and above all that "die in the last ditch"
spirit which leads a man to do for a cause everything that is reasonably
possible, and, when that is done, to achieve the impossible by sheer will
power. The same is true to a greater or lesser degree of practically every
athletic sport which is exhibited in a stadium.
It seems to us that, to hold things of this kind are less fitted for the
ultimate purpose of our public schools, to wit, the making of good
citizens, physically, mentally, and morally, than the study of algebra and
Latin, is an absurdity5
7
In more recent years, other state courts have expanded on the ideas set
forth in Alexander. In Pauley v. Kelly,58 a school financing case, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals defined education as "the development
of mind, body and social morality (ethics) to prepare persons for useful and
happy occupations, recreation and citizenship." '59 Expanding this definition,
the Court continued:
Legally recognized elements in this definition are development in every
child to his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to add, subtract,
multiply and divide numbers; (3) knowledge of government to the extent
that the child will be equipped as a citizen to make informed choices
among persons and issues that affect his own governance; (4) self-knowl-
edge and knowledge of his or her total environment to allow the child
to intelligently choose life work-to know his or her options; (5) work-
training and advanced academic training as the child may intelligently
choose; (6) recreational pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts, such as
music, theatre, literature, and the visual arts; (8) social ethics, both
behavioral and abstract, to facilitate compatibility with others in their
society.60
Clearly, the elements on this list are not all developed in the classroom.
Extracurricular activities, such as student government, student clubs and
organizations, band, and athletic teams all play an important role in this
overall development. Thus, if the court wants to insure that one's "fun-
damental right" to receive an education is advanced, it appears that the
right to participate in extracurricular activities will have to be included within
this "fundamental right."
57. 254 P. at 1059.
58. 255 S.E.2d at 859.
59. Id. at 877.
60. Id.
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Perhaps the case which has gone the farthest in developing the idea that
the right to participate in extracurricular activities is included within one's
"fundamental right" to receive an education is Hartzell v. Connell.6' In
Hartzell, a local high school charged a fee to any student who wished to
participate in extracurricular activities. 62 In deciding whether the plan violated
the free school guarantee of the California Constitution, 3 the California
Supreme Court had to determine whether one's right to participate in extracur-
ricular activities came within the scope of this constitutional provision. After
a lengthy discussion in which the court examined the role extracurricular ac-
tivities play in the overall educational process," ' the court held that "all educa-
tional activities-curricular, or 'extracurricular'-offered to students by school
districts fall within the free school guarantee of article IX, section 5."65 While
the court based its final holding on this determination, it is interesting to note
that Chief Justice Bird, in a concurring opinion, also found the plan to violate
the equal protection guarantee of the California Constitution. 66 In doing so,
the Chief Justice subjected the plan to strict scrutiny since she found that
"educational extracurricular activities-like their credit generating
counterparts-promote the constitutionally recognized purposes of public
education. Accordingly, they are encompassed within the concept of educa-
tion as a fundamental interest." 6 Thus, in those states which have held educa-
tion to be a "fundamental right," there is definitely persuasive precedent to
support the position that a student's right to participate in extracurricular
activities is also included within this right. As such, a strong argument can
be made that a "no pass, no play" rule should be subject to strict scrutiny
in these states.
By applying strict scrutiny to a "no pass, no play" rule, it becomes evident
that such a rule will be found to violate the state's equal protection clause.
While the government may arguably have a compelling interest in promoting
the quality of education received by its youth, there has been no showing
that a "no pass, no play" rule actually achieves this goal.68 In fact, several
commentators have suggested that a "no pass, no play" rule does just the
opposite. These commentators suggest that such a rule leads a number of
61. 35 Cal. 3d 899, 679 P.2d 35, 201 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1984).
62. 679 P.2d at 36-37.
63. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
64. 679 P.2d at 38-43. The cited portion of the court's opinion presents an excellent
discussion of the valuable contributions that extracurricular activities make to the overall
educational process.
65. Id. at 43.
66. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a)-(b); art. IV, § 16(a).
67. Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 52 (Bird, J., concurring).
68. Reinhold, supra note 4, § 1, at 16, col. 2 ("[Wlhether the rule was actually raising
achievement is still an open question, Larry Yawn, the Governor's education aide, conceded.
He said the state was only now beginning to gather the data to answer the question .... ").
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students to drop out of school altogether 69 or to avoid challenging course
work.70 Certainly a rule which may have this effect does not meet the tight
means-ends fit which is required under strict scrutiny. Thus, in those states
which have held education to be a "fundamental right," a state equal
protection challenge to a "no pass, no play" rule will probably be successful.
2. Application of the Federal Framework in States Which
Have Held Education Not To Be a "Fundamental Right"
In those states which have followed the lead of the United States Supreme
Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez7' and have
held education not to be a "fundamental right" protected by the state consti-
tution, a state equal protection challenge to a "no pass, no play" rule seems
to have little or no chance of success. The analysis here is very similar to
that developed in Part I of this Note where the author considered the merits
of a federal equal protection challenge to a "no pass, no play" rule.72
Basically, since these courts have held that the right to education is not a
"fundamental right," they will almost certainly not be willing to hold one's
right to participate in extracurricular activities to be a "fundamental right."
Thus, strict scrutiny will not be the appropriate standard of review.
While one could try to argue that the importance of education, and the
role that extracurricular activities play in the overall educational process,
call for an intermediate-level standard of review, this argument is again a.
weak one. Examining those cases in which state courts have held education
not to be a "fundamental right" protected by their constitution, one finds
that even though the courts have recognized the importance of education,
they have still gone on to apply a rational-basis standard of review.73 If a
court is not willing to apply intermediate-level scrutiny when one's right to
receive an education is at issue, it will not be willing to apply intermediate-
level scrutiny when one's right to participate in extracurricular activities is
at issue. Thus, one can conclude that a state equal protection challenge to
a "no pass, no play" rule in a state that has held education not to be a
"fundamental right" will have a very slim chance of success.
3. Application of the Federal Framework in Those States
Which Have Not Considered the Issue of Whether
Education Is a "Fundamental Right"
A majority of the state courts in the nation have never directly decided
whether education is a "fundamental right" protected by their state con-
69. See A New Law Cuts Deep in the Heart of Texas, supra note 4, at 17.
70. See Levin, A Tough New Texas Law Tosses High School Football for a Late-Season
Loss, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Nov. 18, 1985, at 52.
71. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
72. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Lujan, 649 P.2d 1005; McDaniel, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156.
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stitution. A challenger to a "no pass, no play" rule in such a state would
initially want to argue that education should be recognized as a "fundamental
right" under the state constitution and that one's right to participate in
extracurricular activities comes within the scope of this "fundamental right."
Certainly, such a challenger would want to cite the applicable case law in
other jurisdictions which supports this position.7 4 However, one would also
want to point out the close relationship between the states and the system
of public education. As the Supreme Court observed in Brown v. Board of
Education,75 "[tioday, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments." ' 76 This observation is supported by the fact
that all of the fifty state constitutions contain clauses regarding the estab-
lishment and support of a free public school system. 77 Thus, there is con-
siderable support for the position that education should be recognized as a
"fundamental right" in those states which have yet to decide the issue.
However, even before this decision is reached, there are persuasive arguments
that an individual can make to support a state equal protection challenge
against a "no pass, no play" rule.
An individual raising a state equal protection challenge in a state that has
not yet decided whether education is a "fundamental right" would want to
assert that the sheer importance of education itself, and the role that extra-
curricular activities play in the overall educational process, should certainly
require the government to make more than a mere rational-basis showing
to justify the classification created by a "no pass, no play" rule. This was
the position adopted by the Montana Supreme Court in Montana ex rel.
Bartmess v. Board of Trustees.78 In Bartmess, the plaintiffs argued that the
"no pass, no play" rule adopted by Helena High Schools violated their
equal protection rights under both the federal and state constitutions.79 The
74. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. Id. at 493.
77. ALA. CONST. art. 14, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 6; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN.
CONST. art. 8, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII,§ 1; HAWAn CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND.
CONST. art. VIII, § I; IowA CONST. art. IX, § 12; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183;
LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MAsS. CONST.
chap. V, § II; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Miss. CONST. art.
8, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3); NEB. CONST. art. VII, §
1; NEv. CONST. art. 11, § 2; N.H. CONST. art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST.
art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1); N.D. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; OHIo CONST. art. I, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST.
art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. 12, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST.
§ 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. CONsT. art. XII, § 1;
WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
78. 726 P.2d 801 (Mont. 1986).
79. Id. at 803.
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court quickly rejected the federal claim since the United States Supreme
Court had specifically held education not to be a "fundamental right." '80
The issue then became whether the rule violated the state's equal protection
clause.
In deciding this issue, the court first pointed out that it was not deciding
"whether or not the right to education itself [was] a fundamental right." '
Rather, the court reviewed a number of Montana cases which had recognized
the importance of extracurricular activities and held that, while one's right
to participate in extracurricular activities was not a "fundamental right"
under the state's constitution, it was clearly a right "subject to constitutional
protection. 82 Having made this decision, the court held that a "middle-tier
analysis" 3 was the appropriate standard to apply to the state equal protection
challenge and that under such a standard the government "must demonstrate
that its classification is substantially related to an important governmental
objective." 4
In applying this "middle-tier" standard of review, the Bartmess court
upheld the "no pass, no play" rule in question.85 However, the Bartmess
court applied a very weak version of "middle-tier" review. While the school
board had conceded that extracurricular activities were "a fundamental
ingredient of the educational process,"81 6 and the court recognized that there
were no "studies showing improved grades for students operating under such
a [no pass, no play] rule," 87 the court nevertheless found the "middle-tier"
standard of review to be satisfied. 8 Certainly, an argument can be made
that, had the court applied the more rigorous standard normally associated
with intermediate-level scrutiny, the rule would have been struck down.
Nevertheless, the application of a heightened standard of review at least
indicates that the challengers of a "no pass, no play" rule have a good
chance of invalidating such a rule, even if the state court has not yet decided
the issue of whether education should be classified as a "fundamental right."
C. State Equal Protection Analysis in Those States Which Have
Rejected the Federal Framework
In recent years, a few state courts have decided to completely abandon
the analytical concept of determining what is, and what is not, a "funda-
80. Id.
81. Id. at 802.
82. Id. at 805.
83. Id. at 804-05.
84. Id. at 805.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 810 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 805.
88. Id.
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mental right" for purposes of equal protection analysis.8 9 The New Jersey
Supreme Court summed up the reasoning of these states when it wrote:
[W]e have not found helpful the concept of a "fundamental" right. No
one has successfully defined the term for this purpose. Even the prop-
osition discussed in Rodriguez, that a right is "fundamental" if it is
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, is immediately
vulnerable, for the right to acquire and hold property is guaranteed in
the Federal and State Constitutions, and surely that right is not a likely
candidate for such preferred treatment. And if a right is somehow found
to be "fundamental," there remains the question as to what State interest
is "compelling" and there, too, we find little, if any, light. Mechanical
approaches to the delicate problem of judicial intervention under either
the equal protection or the due process clauses may only divert a court
from the meritorious issue or delay consideration of it.9°
The question then becomes what approach do these states employ to
analyze a state equal protection challenge. Examining the relevant case law,
several cases suggest that these states have adopted what can be categorized
as a balancing approach to equal protection analysis. In Dupree v. Alma
School District No. 30,91 the Supreme Court of Arkansas found a school
financing scheme to violate the equal protection clause of the state consti-
tution. In doing so, the court balanced the individual's right to receive an
education against the government's financing plan. On the individual's side
of the scale, the court found that "[e]ducation becomes the essential pre-
requisite that allows our citizens to be able to appreciate, claim and effectively
realize their established rights." 92 On the government side of the scale, the
court found that the financing plan bore "no rational relationship to the
educational needs of the individual districts." 93 In light of this balance, the
court found the financing plan to be in violation of the equal protection
clause of the state constitution.
Similarly, in Olsen v. Oregon,9 4 the Supreme Court of Oregon was con-
fronted with an equal protection challenge to a school financing plan. In
considering this challenge, the court wrote that:
We prefer the approach made by the New Jersey court in Robinson v.
Cahill. Its approach could be termed a balancing test. Under this ap-
proach the court weighs the detriment to the education of the children
89. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980). In interpreting
the equal protection guarantees of the New Hampshire Constitution, the court first wrote, "we
are not confined to federal constitutional standards and are free to grant individuals more
rights that [sic] the Federal Constitution requires." The court then went on to conclude that
the appropriate standard of review was "whether the challenged classifications are reasonable
and have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Id.
90. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491-92, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (1973) (citation omitted).
91. 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
92. Id. at 93.
93. Id.
94. 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
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of certain districts against the ostensible justification for the scheme of
school financing. If the court determines the detriment is much greater
than the justification, the financing scheme violates the guarantee of
equal protection.95
However, in applying the balancing test here, the court found the financing
plan to survive the equal protection challenge. 91 In examining the individual's
side of the scale, the court found that "[t]he present financing system does
not totally deprive the children of the poorest district in Oregon . . .of an
education." 97 On the government side of the scale, the court found that
"this tradition of local government providing services paid for by local taxes
existed at the time of statehood and continues to be a basic accepted principle
of Oregon government." 98 In light of these variables, one can see why the
court held the equal protection clause not to be violated.
In those states which apply this balancing approach to a state equal
protection challenge, it is not exactly clear how a given state will respond
when such a challenge is asserted against a "no pass, no play" rule. However,
it is obvious that a court will have to consider and explain the interests
which lie on both sides of the scale before it draws any conclusion. As the
Olsen court observed, the balancing approach "seems to better expose the
court's reasoning in reaching its decision as compared to distinguishing
between what is important and what is fundamental." 99 Thus, before one
can decide on the merits of a state equal protection challenge to a "no pass,
no play" rule in one of these states, one must first examine the interests on
both sides of the scale.
The interest on the government's side of the scale when it adopts a "no
pass, no play" rule is to advance the quality of education received by the
youth within its state. The government wants to develop a citizenry that
possesses the basic educational skills needed to participate in the social,
political, and economic systems of our society. While most would agree that
this is a legitimate interest of government, there is some question as to
whether a "no pass, no play" rule actually promotes this interest. Many
would argue that a "no pass, no play" rule actually leads children to drop
out of school altogether or to pursue course work which does not challenge
the individual's intellect.00 If this is true, it is clear that a "no pass, no
play" rule does little or nothing to promote the government's interest. In
addition, some commentators point out that participation in extracurricular
95. Olsen, 554 P.2d at 145 (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 149.
97. Id. at 145.
98. Id. at 147.
99. Id. at 145.
100. See McGrath, supra note 3, at 80; A New Law Cuts Deep in the Heart of Texas, supra
note 4, at 17.
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activities is a valuable educational tool in itself.10 Indeed, several of the
courts referred to in this Note have taken this exact position. 0 2 If partici-
pating in school government or a student club is as valuable to the individual
as the lessons taught in the classrooms, a "no pass, no play" rule again
does little to advance the government's interest.
However, there are those who claim that a "no pass, no play" rule is a
very effective means by which the governmental interest is advanced. Those
who make this claim argue that a "no pass, no play" rule gives children
both the time and the incentive to study. 103 These claimants assert that the
lessons the individual learns in the classroom will be more valuable to both
himself and the government than the lessons learned during extracurricular
activities. If these assertions are true, then the government's side of the scale
becomes more weighty.
Turning to the individual's side of the scale, one must examine the det-
riment that a "no pass, no play" rule places on the child. Those opposed
to a "no pass, no play" rule argue that the detriment is great. First, they
contend that participation in extracurricular activities alone is a crucial part
of the overall educational process. To take this opportunity away from a
certain class of individuals places them at a serious disadvantage when
compared to those that are allowed to participate.' °4 Second, it is argued
that no matter how hard some individuals work, they are not going to be
able to achieve the required academic level of performance in every class. 0 5
While a student may have trouble with geometry, he may excel in drama
or music. To take away the individual's opportunity to participate in the
school play or the school band because of one poor grade does little for
the individual or the government. A person should be allowed to develop
the skills that he does have rather than being forced to perform a skill that
he does not have. Third, there may be a financial detriment to the individual
who is hoping to afford a college education by relying on a music, drama,
or athletic scholarship.' 6 Denying the individual the right to participate in
extracurricular activities may negate this chance. Finally, some commentators
feel that there is emotional and psychological damage suffered by the in-
dividual who is effected by a "no pass, no play" rule.'0
Obviously, proponents of a "no pass, no play" rule believe that the
detriment to the individual is slight. They point out that the ban is usually
101. See Taylor, supra note 31, at 10.
102. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
103. See McGrath, supra note 3, at 80.
104. See Taylor, supra note 31, at 10.
105. See Levin, supra note 70, at 53; Johnson, supra note 4, at 32.
106. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 32.
107. Id.
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only for a short period of time, and that the individual who earns the return
of his privilege to participate will be better off in the long run. 08
The discussion of the interests that are represented on both sides of the
scale shows that a state which employs the balancing approach to equal
protection analysis might go either way. There are certainly significant in-
terests at stake for both the government and the individual. To a large
extent, the final outcome of such a challenge will depend on the individual
state court's perception of the value of extracurricular activities. If these
activities are highly valued, the "no pass, no play" rule is likely to be
invalidated. If they are not, the rule is likely to be upheld. However, no
matter which outcome is reached, the balancing approach does have the
advantage of requiring a court to set forth explicitly the interests it feels to
be of significance. This alone helps to focus the public's attention on the
impact which these "no pass, no play" rules have had on the individual
and on whether they are actually effective.
CONCLUSION
"No pass, no play" rules have been adopted in many areas throughout
the country. As these rules continue to increase in number, it is clear that
more and more individuals will turn to the courts to challenge their validity.
This Note has shown that the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution offers little help to such challengers. However, the equal pro-
tection clause of each individual state constitution suggests a different result.
In recent years, state courts have become much more protective of individual
rights by interpreting their own constitutions. This fact, along with the ap-
plicable case law in several states, suggests that a state equal protection
challenge may provide a successful means by which to invalidate a "no pass,
no play" rule. Thus, if the individuals who are adversely affected by these
rules are to find constitutional protection, that protection will have to be
found within their own state constitutions, -rather than within the Federal
Constitution.
DAVID J. SHANNON
108. See McGrath, supra note 3, at 80.
19871

